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Abstract 
This paper estimates the impact of the extension of compulsory schooling in Turkey from 5 
to 8 years—which increased the 8th grade completion rate for women by 30 percentage 
points—on marriage and birth outcomes of teenage women in Turkey. We find that increased 
compulsory schooling years reduce the probability of teenage marriage and births for women 
substantially, and these effects persist well beyond the new compulsory schooling years: the 
probability of marriage by age 18 falls by more than 4 percentage points and the probability 
of giving birth by age 19 falls by more than 4.5 percentage points for the earliest cohorts 
affected by the policy. In addition, the new policy increases the time to first-birth after 
marriage. We find conclusive evidence that longer compulsory schooling years have human 
capital effects on the time to first-birth, as well as incarcertation effects on teenage marriage; 
there is also suggestive evidence for human capital effects on teenage marriage. 
 
JEL classification: J12, J13, I21, I28, D10. 
Keywords: Teenage marriage, Teenage births, Education, Compulsory Schooling Policy, 
Regression-Discontunity. 
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1. Introduction  
Teenage marriage and births remain at significant levels in Turkey. According to the 
2008 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, of the 25- to 49-year-old women, 43 percent 
were married before age 20, a quarter were married before age 18, and five percent were 
married before age 15. The fraction who gives their first-birth at teenage years is also high: of 
the 25- to 49-year-old women in 2008, 29 percent gave their first-birth before age 20. 
Adolescent marriage is also widespread around the world. Among the 20-24 year old women, 
the fraction that is reported to be married before age 18 was 74.5 in Niger, 66.2 in 
Bangladesh, 55.9 in Mozambique, 49.2 in Ethiopia, 44.5 in India, and 44.3 in Nicaragua 
according to the most recent Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) statistics for each 
country.1 There is also a strong correlation between child marriage and education in several 
developing countries.2 In Turkey, among women aged 25 to 49 in 2008, while the median age 
of marriage was 18.7 for those with no school degree, it was 24.1 for those with a high school 
degree or above. However, does this imply that an increase in women’s educational 
attainment decreases teenage marriage and births? 
In this study, we examine the effects of an increase in women’s educational 
attainment—through the implementation of a longer compulsory schooling duration policy—
on age at marriage, age at first-birth, and the time to first-birth after marriage. For this 
purpose, we use a major education reform in Turkey that took place in 1997. According to 
this policy, compulsory schooling was extended from 5 to 8 years in 1997. Due to the length 
of this extension and the high fraction of students who drop out of school after completing the 
compulsory level in Turkey, this policy brought about a substantial improvement in 
educational outcomes.3 In fact, among girls, 8th grade completion rate increased by 30 
percentage points, and 11th grade completion rate (high school graduation) increased by more 
than 7 percentage points.  
                                               
1
 Source: International Center for Research on Women. 
2
 For instance, in Mozambique, while 60 percent of women with no education are married by age 18, 
this fraction is 10 percent for women with secondary schooling and less than 1 percent for women with higher 
education. (Source: International Center for Research on Women) 
3
 Kırdar (2009) reports for girls whose mother tongue is Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic that the drop-out 
rate after the completion of compulsory schooling was 35 percent, 60 percent, and 48 percent, respectively. 
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In many developing countries, teenage marriage and births have been associated with 
several adverse outcomes, including worse mother and child health (see, for instance, Alam 
[2000] for Bangladesh, Raj et al. [2009, 2010] for India), worse educational outcomes (see, 
for instance, Lloyd and Mensch [2008] for sub-Saharan Africa), and a higher probability of 
domestic violence (UNICEF, 2005). There is also some evidence for causal effects of early 
marriage; for instance, Field and Ambrus (2008) find a positive effect of delayed age at 
marriage on years of schooling in Bangladesh. In Turkey, for mothers younger than 20, 
neonatal mortality rate was almost twice as much and perinatal mortality rate was almost 
three times as much as those for mothers aged 20 to 29 during the period from 1998 to 2008 
(2008 DHS). In a study conducted in Eastern Turkey, where teenage marriage is especially 
high, Edirne et al. (2010) find that teenage mothers have lower education and are more likely 
to face domestic violence, and their births have a higher risk of preterm delivery and low 
birth weight. 
In socially conservative countries, where giving birth out-of-wedlock is socially 
condemned and therefore is rare, mandating teens to stay in school for longer years is a 
potentially important intervention on childbearing because longer schooling delays the time 
at which girls enter the marriage market. A delay in the entry to the marriage market implies 
an automatic delay in childbearing in these countries. In fact, an important characteristic of 
the transition into motherhood of women in Turkey is that almost all are married at the time 
of birth. The sociology literature reports a rigid sequence of events of completion of 
education, marriage, and, birth of the first child in other countries as well (Blossfeld and De 
Rose, 1992; Marini, 1984). A key fact in this sequence of events is that the gap between the 
age at marriage and first-birth is quite narrow in Turkey. Given this narrow gap between the 
timing of marriage and first-birth and the fact that marriage and schooling are generally 
incompatible events, a change in the timing of marriage as a result of increased schooling 
would directly translate into a change in the timing of early fertility as well. 
There is substantial evidence for adverse implications of teenage marriage and 
childbearing in developed countries, as well. In developed countries, the focus has been on 
the implications of childbearing as marriage is certainly not a prerequisite for motherhood in 
these countries. This literature has gone beyond establishing associations and uncovered 
causal effects of teenage motherhood on certain labor market and health outcomes for women 
and their children. Klepinger et al. (1999), Chevalier and Viitanen (2003), and Fletcher and 
Wolfe (2009) find that teenage motherhood reduces schooling, work experience and market 
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wages.4 Levine and Painter (2003) as well as Holmlund (2005) also confirm that teen-
childbearing reduces education substantially. Webbink et al. (2008) find that teenage 
motherhood increases smoking and the probability of being overweight. On the other hand, 
studies that investigate the causal relationship between adolescent fertility and child health 
outcomes have arrived at mixed results (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1995; Wolpin, 1997). 
Intergenerational effects of early childbearing are also reported. Francesconi (2008) finds that 
children of teenage mothers have lower educational attainment, lower earnings and greater 
risks of inactivity and teenage childbearing. Hunt (2006) confirms that teenage mothers are 
more likely to engage in crime. At the macroeconomic level, İyigün (2000) shows that early 
childbearing may lead to a development trap with low human capital. There have also been 
studies that focus on the implications of teenage marriage only; for instance, Dahl (2010) 
finds that teen marriage increases future poverty, and Le Strat et al. (2011) report that it is 
associated with a higher incidence of mental illness among women in the US. 
The data in this study come from the 2003 and 2008 waves of the Turkish 
Demographic and Health Survey, which is representative nationally and contains detailed 
information on transitions to marriage and fertility. The break across the year-of-birth cohorts 
in terms of the exposure to the policy yields the structure of the data suitable for a regression-
discontinuity design in estimating the effects of the compulsory schooling policy. We also 
conduct a battery of robustness checks, using various specifications, sample restrictions, and 
falsification checks. 
Our results indicate that the extension of compulsory schooling in Turkey reduced the 
probability of marriage and giving birth for teenage women substantially. Moreover, the 
impact of the extension of compulsory schooling persists well beyond the new compulsory 
schooling years. We find that, for the 1989 birth-cohort, the percentage of women ever-
married by age 15 drops by 50 percent, and the percentage of women ever-married by age 18 
drops by 21 percent (more than 4 percentage points). As a result of the rigid sequence of 
marriage and childbearing, the fraction of women who give birth by age 19 drops by 4.5 
percentage points. 
We also investigate the channels through which the new compulsory schooling policy 
affect teenage marriage and births. One channel is the incarceration effect (also called the 
institution effect), which takes place because schooling and marriage are incompatible events. 
                                               
4
 An exception is Hotz et al. (2005), who in fact find positive effects on annual ours of work and 
earnings.  
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The second channel is the human capital effect, which refers to the effects of increased 
education after schooling is completed (through its effects, for instance, on wages or 
preferences). Since all women are virtually out of school after marriage in Turkey, we can 
test the existence of a human capital effect on the time to first-birth after marriage. We find 
evidence for incarceration effects of the new education policy on teenage marriage and births, 
as well as evidence for human capital effects on the time to first-birth. There is also 
suggestive evidence for human capital effects of the education policy on teenage marriage. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 places our study in the relevant 
literature. Section 3 provides background information on marriage and fertility behavior as 
well as the education system in Turkey, and Section 4 outlines a conceptual framework for 
this study. Data and descriptive statistics are given in Section 5, and the identification 
strategy and etimation are explained in Section 6. Section 7 presents the results, and Section 8 
provides a discussion of our key findings. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
2. Relevant Literature 
There have been a number of both quasi-experimental and experimental studies 
investigating the causal link between education and marriage as well as fertility.5 The quasi-
experimental literature includes settings both in the developed and developing countries. 
While Black et al. (2008) and Skirbekk et al. (2004) explore the effects of education policies 
on marriage and birth outcomes (intention-to-treat effects), as we do, others estimate the 
effect of education on certain marriage and fertility outcomes using IV methodology. 
In terms of marriage outcomes, Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) find that education does 
not have an effect on whether or not a woman in the U.S. ever gets married; on the other 
hand, examining the timing of marriage, Breierova and Duflo (2004) and Skirbekk et al. 
(2004) find that education delays the age at marriage in Indonesia and Sweden, respectively. 
In terms of fertility outcomes, Amin and Behrman (2011), Breierova and Duflo, and Osili and 
Long (2007) report that the number of children decreases in education in the U.S., Indonesia, 
and Nigeria, respectively.6 In a similar Middle-Eastern context to our study—for Arabs in 
                                               
5
 There have been also some studies that use structural estimation; for instance, Brein and Lillard 
(1994) find that education increases the age at marriage in Malaysia. 
6
 Fort et al. (2011), on the contrary, find that average number of children per woman increases in 
education; however, this is a cross-country study that uses changes in compulsory schooling laws in various 
European countries at different times. 
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Israel, Lavy and Zablotsky (2011) find that education decreases the total number of live 
births, but has no effect on age at marriage. Skirbekk et al. and Monstad et al. (2008), for 
Norway, and Amin and Behrman, for the U.S., report that age at birth is delayed by 
education. Some studies exclusively focus on teenage fertility; for instance, Black et al. 
(2008)—for the U.S. and Norway—and Ozier (2011)—for the U.S.—show that teenage 
pregnancy is reduced by education whereas McCrary and Royer (2011) find no such effect in 
the US.7  
Unlike the previous quasi-experimental studies examining marriage outcomes, our 
study focuses on the effect of education policy on teenage marriage. Our examination of 
teenage births is most similar to that in Black et al. (2008) in the way that we examine the 
effect of the policy at each age, separately. In fact, Black et al. also estimate the causal impact 
of changes in compulsory schooling laws on teenage births. However, there are significant 
contextual differences in the teenage fertility setting of Black et al.—Norway and the U.S.—
and ours. First of all, in Turkey marriage is virtually a necessary condition for teenage 
fertility (which is explained in more detail in the next section); therefore, unlike Black et al., 
we study the transition to marriage along with the transition to motherhood. Due to the same 
reason, the channels through which compulsory schooling affects teenage births are different 
in our context. In fact, we examine whether any change in the time to first-birth is caused by 
a change in the time to marriage or in the time until first-birth after marriage (or both). 
There has also been some recent work that examines the effects of experimental 
programs that aim to retain girls in school on teenage marriage and childbearing. For 
instance, Baird et al. (2010), evaluating a cash transfer program to girls in Malawi, find a fall 
in teenage marriage and pregnancy one-year after the program for program participants who 
were out of school at the baseline, but not for school girls.8 In another study in the same 
setting, Baird et al. (2011) distinguish the effects of conditional cash transfers (CCT) and 
unconditional cash transfers (UCT). Again, they find a strong effect of school enrollment on 
marriage; however, since the CCT policy effect on school enrollment is relatively small, the 
resulting CCT policy effect on marriage is not detectable. On the other hand, they find a 
strong negative effect of UCT policy on marriage because of the income effect on the large 
                                               
7
 Since the instruments that Ozier (2011) and McCrary and Royer (2011) use are different, their 
estimates for the effect of education are for different subpopulations. 
8
 The monthly amount of transfer to households was around 15 percent of average household 
consumption. 
 8
group of school drop-outs. Duflo et al. (2006) evaluate the effect of a program that reduces 
schooling costs in Kenya by providing free school uniforms conditional on school attendance, 
along with two other inventions. They find that both teenage marriage and childbearing rates 
go down. An important difference of our analysis from these experimental studies is the 
heterogeneity in our program impact estimates: we calculate the program impact at each age 
separately whereas Baird et al. (2010) and Baird et al. (2011) calculate the average effect of 
the policy for 12-22 and 13-22 age groups, respectively, and Duflo et al. (2006) calculates it 
for a single grade cohort in one year.9 
Another important distinguishing characteristic of our study is the strength of the 
exogenous variation in schooling due to the long duration of the extension of compulsory 
schooling in Turkey, three extra years, and the high percentage of students whose behavior is 
actually affected. The other major compulsory schooling policy used in this literature is the 
extension of compulsory schooling in Norway by two years in 1959 (see, for instance, Black 
et al. [2008] and Monstad et al. [2008]). Monstad et al. report that the birth-cohorts who were 
affected by this policy in Norway and who were roughly 5 years younger than the control 
group had 0.5 years more education. On the other hand, in our study, the completed years of 
schooling for women by age 18 increases by about 1 year as a result of the education policy.  
Finally, the estimated magnitudes of the policy change in our study are much larger 
than those in Black et al. (2008), who also examine the effect of a major compulsory 
schooling policy on teenage births by age. For instance, in one of the largest effect they find, 
the policy of mandating women to stay in school until age 17 reduces the probability of birth 
by age 19 by 8.8 percent in the US.10 In comparison, we find that mandating women in 
Turkey to stay in school until completing grade 8 (roughly age 14) reduces the probability of 
giving birth by age 17 by a striking 43 percent. In addition, considering the finding by Baird 
et al. (2011) that a cash transfer policy in Kenya that is unconditional on school enrollment 
and equivalent to 10 percent of household consumption reduces teenage pregnancy by 27 
percent, the effectiveness of the extension of compulsory schooling in Turkey in decreasing 
teenage marriage and births becomes even clearer. 
                                               
9
 Baird et al. (2011) also provide impact estimates for two separate groups by age: 13-15 and 16-22. 
However, the results are surprising: in the conditional treatment, while the effect of the policy on school 
enrollment is stronger for the older age group, the effect of the policy on marriage and pregnancy is weaker. 
10
 They find smaller effects for Norway. 
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3. Background Information on Marriage, Fertility, and Education in 
Turkey 
3.1. Marriage and Fertility 
Despite the rise in non-marital unions in the West, marriage as a social institution 
remains strong in Turkey. Almost all women marry by age 49 and 98 percent give birth at 
least once; in contrast, divorce is an unlikely event, with its rate estimated at less than 2 
percent among 15-49 year-old women (2008 DHS). Hence, it would not be incorrect to say 
that for an average woman in Turkey marriage is for life. Giving birth out-of-wedlock is even 
rarer than choosing an alternative living arrangement. According to DHS data, almost all 
births are to a married woman. Age at first-birth is also closely linked to age at marriage; the 
lapse of time between marriage and first-birth is on average 1.6 years. The average fertility 
rate currently stands at 2.16 births per woman (2008 DHS). 
Marriage occurs early on in life. The median age at first marriage was 20.8 years 
among women aged 25-49 in 2008 (DHS data). However, age at marriage and age at first-
birth have been increasing in Turkey: according to 2008 DHS data, while the median age of 
marriage was 19.5 for the 45-49 age group, it was 22.1 for the 25-29 age group; in fact, 
during the 15-year period from 1993 to 2008, the median age at marriage increased by almost 
2 years. Despite the rise in age at marriage over time, the incidence of teenage marriage 
remains high among younger birth-cohorts: of the women aged 25-29 in 2008, 34 percent 
were married by age 20 and 17 percent were married by age 18 (DHS data). 
As a result of their early age at marriage, Turkish women give their first birth at an 
early age as well. According to the 2008 DHS data, the median age at first-birth for 25 to 49- 
year-old women was 22.3. Age at first-birth has also increased over time with the rising age 
at marriage: in 2008, while the median age at first-birth was 21.0 for women aged 45 to 49, it 
was 23.9 for women aged 25-29. Nonetheless, the incidence of first-birth during teenage 
years remains high even among the younger generations: of the 25 to 29 year-old women in 
2008, 22 percent had given birth before age 20 and 8 percent before age 18 (DHS data).  
The Civil Code prohibits the marriage of young men and women before age 17. 
However, a marriage could still happen through a religious ceremony before the child comes 
of age. Indeed, 3.84 percent of 16-year-old women in 2008 were married, for instance, and 
that could only be possible through a religious ceremony. Most couples have both a religious 
and a civil marriage; however, the fraction of women who only have a religious marriage is 
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quite significant. For instance, both in 1993 and in 1998, almost 8 percent of all 15 to 49 
year-old women had a religious marriage only; this share dropped to 6 percent in 2003 and to 
4 percent in 2008 (DHS data). Among teenage women, the fraction with a religious marriage 
only remains remarkably high. The fraction of 15- to 19-year-old married women who had an 
only religious marriage was 33 percent in 1993, this fraction dropped only to 29 percent in 
2008 (DHS data). 
3.2. New Compulsory Schooling Policy 
Before the change in the basic education law, the education system in Turkey 
consisted of five years of primary, three years of lower secondary and three years of upper 
secondary schooling. The first tier was compulsory. In 1997, compulsory education was 
increased from five to eight years by combining the first two tiers. Improving the attendance 
rate at the lower secondary school level was a long established goal. While the net school 
enrollment rate before the enactment of the law was 89.4 percent in five-year compulsory 
schooling, it was 52.8 percent in lower secondary and 38.5 percent in higher secondary 
schooling (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2012). However, the exact timing of the 
implementation of the new education policy had to do with the political developments of that 
time. The secular government that came to power in 1997 wanted to prevent children from 
enrolling in religious schools at an early age. This policy reform would at least delay this by 
three years. 
The new compulsory schooling law, which was enacted in the summer of 1997, 
covered children who completed grade 4 or lower at the end of the 1996-97 school year (who 
did not hold a primary school diploma at the time of the implementation of the policy). 
Therefore, we would see an increase in enrollment rates during the 1998-99 school year for 
the first time, when the oldest cohort that is affected by the policy start grade 6. Enrollment 
data from the Turkish Ministry of Education (2011) show that enrollment rose by 4.50 
percent during the 1998-1999 school year, by 5.69 percent during the 1999-2000 school year, 
and by 4.05 percent during the 2000-2001 school year; whereas the rise in enrollment in the 
2001-2002 school year was 0.98 percent and the percent increase in enrollment in the 
following 10 years averaged 0.5 percent. In other words, as a result of the extension of 
compulsory schooling by 3 years, enrollment in 3 consecutive academic years rose by much 
more than the average. 
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Since students who completed grade four or lower grades at the end of the 1996-1997 
school year were bound by the new policy, compulsory schooling was for eight years for all 
students who started the first grade in September 1993 or later; but it was five years for those 
who started earlier. Even though not all children start school at the same age in Turkey, we 
do not have the information on school starting age in our data set. Therefore, we assume that 
all children start school at age six. Accordingly, children who are born at or after 1987 are 
affected by the policy. 
4. Conceptual Framework 
We center our conceptual framework on marriage models, in particular those that 
explain the timing of marriage, because the timing of first-birth in Turkey is largely 
determined by the timing of marriage. The prominent theories in this area are the marriage 
model of Becker (1973, 1991) and the search models of Keeley (1977, 1979) and 
Oppenheimer (1988). 
Becker’s theory of marriage market is structured around the specialization hypothesis, 
according to which marriage occurs because the total welfare of husband and wife at the 
married state are higher—due to specialization of each partner in activities that they have a 
comparative advantage, market work for husband and household work for wife—than the 
sum of their individual welfares at the single status. According to this theory, the gains to 
specialization decrease with the increasing education of women. However, in our context, 
both men’s and women’s education increase; therefore, the effect on the gains to 
specialization is not obvious. Keeley (1977) uses the main features of Becker’s theory within 
a search model to explain the age at marriage. Within this framework, the age of entry into 
the marriage market and the duration of search for a partner determine the age at marriage, 
where the duration of search depends on the gains and costs of searching. For women, a 
higher level of education could decrease the search costs for a partner (by increasing ability 
in and, therefore, efficiency of the search process), which would increase the duration of 
search. Moreover, with the increasing education and, therefore, earnings of younger men, the 
gains from waiting and searching more increase for women. On the other hand, in 
Oppenheimer’s theory, the critical aspect that determines the age at marriage for both men 
and women—in a traditional setting where women are not in the labor force—is the time at 
which the uncertainty surrounding men’s career path is resolved. 
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Examining the earlier work both in the economics and sociology literatures, Brüderl 
and Diekmann (1997) discuss two main channels through which education influences 
marriage, within the specialization hypothesis: institution effect and human capital effect. 
According to the institution effect, schooling and marriage are incompatible events. Thornton 
et al. (1995) point out three main reasons for this: i) students are not prepared for adult roles, 
ii) school requires a lot of time, iii) financial independence is needed for marriage. This 
argument is also consistent with Becker’s specialization hypothesis because the gains from 
specialization cannot be realized until after completing schooling: women would not have 
sufficient time for home production and men would not have sufficent income. The 
institution effect is also referred to as the “incarceration effect” later in the economics 
literature (Black et al., 2008). 
According to the human capital effect, even after schooling is completed, increased 
education has a bearing on marriage choices. A particular channel through which this 
happens is market work: with increased schooling, the opportunity cost of marriage and 
raising children increases for women. (This is the channel that is emphasized in the work of 
Becker and in the economics literature in general.) The sociology literature also points out 
other channels through which more education could affect marriage choices. Axinn and 
Barber (2001) discuss “ideational theories”, which explain how schooling changes fertility 
preferences. An example to this is that schooling could increase consumption aspirations and, 
therefore, increase the costs of childbearing and decrease the demand for children. Similar 
arguments could be applied to marriage; a longer education period could change the 
preferences on marriage. 
Education affects the timing of first-birth through a number of channels.11 First, the 
effect of education on marriage translates into an effect on the timing of first-birth in the rigid 
sequence of marriage and fertility in Turkey, as well as in several other countries. However, 
there are additional human capital effects of education on the time to first-birth. First of all, a 
higher level of education for women increases the opportunity of raising children by 
increasing the market wage rate for them (Willis, 1973). This would decrease the desired 
                                               
11
 In his study on low-income countries, Schultz (1994a) estimates that an additional year of schooling 
for women is associated with a 12 percent decline in total fertility. Glewwe (2002) reviews the literature on the 
relationship between schooling and marriage and fertility in developing countries. 
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number of children.12 In addition, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989) show that education 
increases the effective contraceptive use of women. Education could provide better 
knowledge of contraceptive methods via curricula or develop the ability to acquire 
information about them; the second channel was formalized by Grossman (1972), for which 
Glewwe (1999) finds empirical evidence in Morocco. Finally, as claimed by Mason (1986), 
higher bargaining power in fertility decisions for more educated women is another possible 
channel through which education influences fertility decisions. 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data we employ come from the 2003 and 2008 rounds of the Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) of Hacettepe University of Turkey, which is representative nationally.13 
The target population in DHS surveys are women at the reproductive age; however, 
information on family members of these women are also available. The surveys include 
information on the timing of marriage and timing of first-birth on ever-married women, as 
well as information on schooling attainment in the form of highest grade completed for both 
women and men. These three pieces of information are our key outcome variables in this 
study. The DHS surveys also include a rich set of individual and household-level 
characteristics. In particular, we use information on location of residence at age 12—in the 
form of both type of location of residence (large city, small city, village) and geographical 
region of residence (West, South, Central, North, East), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, 
Arabic), and mother’s educational attainment.  
We restrict the sample to 10-49 year-old women at the time of each survey; in this 
case, our pooled sample includes 28,063 women who are born between 1954 and 1998. 
However, in most analyses, we further restrict the sample to women who are born between 
1964 and 1998 (for reasons that will be discussed in the next section), in which case our 
sample includes 24,619 women. The male sample, which we use solely to examine the effect 
of the compulsory schooling law on schooling attainment, comes from the 2008 sample only 
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 This is on condition that the substitution effect dominates the income effect (higher demand for 
children due to a higher level of income). The income effect would be stronger if there is positive assortative 
mating; in other words, women who acquire more schooling marry more educated men with higher income. 
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) find evidence for assortative mating in the US. 
13
 We choose to pool the two rounds of the Turkish DHS to increase the precision of our estimates. 
Only these two rounds of DHS include birth cohorts that are affected by the new education policy. 
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because the information on location of residence at age 12 is not available for men in the 
2003 survey. The male sample that is retricted to 1964 to 1998 birth-cohorts includes 12,796 
persons.14  
In the first part of our analysis of marriage and birth outcomes—where we examine 
the effect of the policy on the level of marriage and first-birth outcomes by age, using the 
information on age-at-marriage and age-at-first-birth, we construct histories of ever-married 
status and ever-given-birth status until age 21 (or until the age of the woman at the time of the 
survey if she is younger than 21). 15 This starts at age 10 in the ever-married status analysis 
and at age 12 in the ever-given-birth analysis, in accordance with the earliest ages these 
events are observed in the data. Therefore, the women in the sample enter the analysis at each 
age until 21 unless they are younger than 21 at the time of the survey.  
In the second part of our analysis of marriage and birth outcomes, where we examine 
the effects of the policy on the timing of marriage and timing of first-birth using duration 
analysis, we construct event histories of time to marriage and time to first-birth. In this case, 
women enter the risk set of marriage and the risk set of first-birth also at ages 10 and 12, 
respectively; however, they exit the risk set (and the data) when they get married in the first 
set and give their first-birth in the second set (unlike the data used in the level analyis). For 
some women, the duration is censored in the right because they do not marry/give birth until 
age 21 or until the last age they are observed in the sample if they are younger than 21 at the 
time of the survey. Unlike the level-analysis, where marriage and first-birth outcomes are 
examined at each age separately, the data are pooled over ages in the timing analyis. There is 
a total of 276,329 person-age observations with the 1954-1998 birth-cohort sample, which 
reduces to 235,001 in the 1964-1998 birth-cohort sample. 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Here, we provide descritive statistics for our primary sample of women born between 
1964 and 1998. Table 1 lists basic descriptive statistics on person-level characteristics in 
panel (a) and on person-age level characteristics in panel (b). Sampling weights are used in 
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 Later birth-cohorts provide information at earlier ages only; for instance, the 1998 birth-cohort 
provide information at age 10 only, the 1993 birth-cohort provide information until age 15, whereas all cohorts 
born at or before 1988 provide information until age 20.  
15
 The event history goes until age 21 because this is the latest age we observe the earliest birth-cohort 
that is affected by the policy, 1987 birth-cohort, in the pooled sample. 
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the calculation of mean values. Roughly 40 percent of the population in our study live in rural 
areas. In terms of mother tongue, almost 17 percent are Kurdish speakers and just over 2 
percent are Arabic speakers. The low levels of mother’s educational attainment is striking: 
46.2 percent of mothers have no schooling, and 55 percent have no schooling degree. As can 
be seen in panel (b), the mean age in our pooled sample is about 15. 
< TABLE 1 HERE > 
Table 2 reports the fractions of ever-married women and women who have given birth 
by age in our sample. The fraction of women who are married at quite young ages is non-
negligible: by age 14, more than 3 percent are already married. This fraction becomes 
especially noticeable after age 15. At age 16, 12.4 percent of women are already married. 
This increases to 29.1 percent at age 18. Accordingly, the fraction of mother teens are also 
high: almost 4.5 percent of 16-year-old women have given birth, and 23.3 percent have given 
birth by age 19.  
< TABLE 2 HERE > 
5.1.1. Graphical Analysis of Schooling, Marriage, and First-Birth over the Birth-
Cohorts 
The effect of the new education policy on schooling outcomes of both men and 
women are illustrated in Figure 1.16 There is a substantial increase among both men and 
women in the fraction that completes 8th grade as a result of the policy. This increase is not 
very sharp but is distributed over a few years—this is especially apparent in the profile for 
women—due to three factors: first, since school start-age differs across children, late starters 
among the 1985 and1986 birth-cohorts would be affected by the policy and early starters 
among the 1987 birth-cohort would not be affected. Second, due to the potential signaling 
effects of the policy—realizing that later-born cohorts will have higher levels of schooling, 
children born before 1987 could decide to stay in school for a longer time—some of the 
earlier cohorts would be indirectly affected by the policy.17 Third, the implementation of the 
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 In this figure, both 2003 and 2008 surveys are used for both men and women. 
17
 In the absence of a signaling effect, we would expect the enrollment in the first year at high school 
(9th grade) to increase in the 2001-02 school year when the first cohort of 6th graders forced to be at school in the 
1998-99 school year reach the 9th grade. However, according to Turkish Ministry of Education (2011), 
enrollment in the 9th grade increased by 21.4 percent in the 1998-99 school year, by 6.7 percent in the 1999-
2000 school year, and by 9.5 percent in the 2000-01 school year; whereas it increased by only 1.9 percent in the 
2001-02 school year and by 2.9 percent in the 2002-03 school year. 
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policy was slow in certain areas; therefore, some children among the 1987 and 1988 birth-
cohorts may not be affected by the policy. Yet, clearly, nowhere else in Figure 1 is there such 
a drastic rise in the 8th grade completion rate as there is at the time of the policy. The more 
interesting feature of Figure 1, though, is the rise in the fraction of both men and women that 
completes the 11th grade (high school) with the policy. In other words, the new education 
policy seems to make an effect on grade completion rates well beyond the new compulsory 
schooling levels. Another important feature of Figure 1 is the strong time trend in the 8th and 
11th grade completion rates before and after the implementation of the policy, which is 
especially prominent for women. 
< FIGURE 1 HERE> 
Figure 2a and Figure 2b display the fraction women ever married and the fraction 
women ever given birth, respectively, over birth-cohorts at selected ages. (Fractional 
polynomials are used in the construction of fitted lines in these figures.) In Figure 2a, the 
discontinuity in the fraction ever married at the time of the policy is especially visible at ages 
14 and 15. Given the fact that the gap between the time of first-birth and the time of marriage 
is just over a year, the discontinuities in the fitted polynomials in Figure 2b are consistent 
with the discontinuities in the fitted polynomials in Figure 2a. There are also strong time 
trends both in the fraction ever married and in the fraction ever given birth. Therefore, in the 
identification strategy, explained in the next section, it will be critical to disentangle the effect 
of the policy from this secular time trend in marriage and birth outcomes. 
< FIGURE 2 HERE> 
6. Identification Strategy and Estimation 
6.1. Identification Strategy 
We use the variation in the years of compulsory schooling across different birth 
cohorts to identify the causal impact of the new compulsory schooling policy on marriage and 
first-birth decisions. The structure of our data, illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, fits a regression-
discontiunity design as there is a discontinuous jump in the outcome variables at the time of 
the policy and the relationship between the outcome variables and the covariate that 
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determines the timing of the jump (forcing variable) is continuous.18 Our data-generating 
process can be written as 
iiii DxfY ηρ ++= )( ,    (1) 
where Y denotes the outcome variable, D denotes the treatment variable, and f(.) stands for 
continuous relationship between the outcome variable and x, the forcing variable (year of 
birth). In equation (1), ρ is the causal effect of interest and η is the error term.19 The value of 
the treatment variable depends on whether or not the forcing variable is above the threshold 
as follows: )1987(1 ≥= ii xD . 
A critical aspect of any regression discontinuity design is to distinguish the 
discontinous jump, )1987(1 ≥ix , from the smooth function f(.). Ideally, one would like to use 
a very flexible functional form for f(.); however, since the discontinous jump in our data is 
distributed over a few years, a very flexible f(.) could partly capture the effect of the policy 
around the discontinuity. However, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the time trends in grade 
completion, marriage, and first-birth outcomes are all very close to linear. Although we fit a 
fractional polynomial to the marriage and first-birth outcomes by age in Figure 2, the 
resulting fits are very close to being linear. Moreover, a more comprehensive analysis by age 
of the time trends in marriage and first-birth rates, displayed in Figure A1 in the Appendix, 
confirms that a linear time trend looks appropriate. Therefore, we choose a linear time trend 
in the most part of our analyses; however, we also check the robustness of our findings using 
a quadratic time trend. 
In all analyses that use a linear time trend, we restrict the sample to 1964 to 1998 birth 
cohorts—in other words, we exclude 1954 to 1963 birth cohorts—because our graphical 
analysis shows that our outcomes variables have a more linear trend in this interval. In 
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 Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide a review of regression-discontinuity design. Hahn et al. (2001) 
construct a theoretical framework for regression-discontunity design, and Angrist and Lavy (1999) and van der 
Klaauw (2002) are examples to some of the earliest applications. Oreopoulos (2006) uses regression-
discontinuity design in his analysis of the effects of compulsory schooling laws on earnings in the UK. 
19
 In this study, we estimate the effect of the compulsory schooling policy rather than use it as an 
instrument for education. The compulsory schooling policy in this study makes substantial changes in both 
women’s and men’s distribution of education. This would certainly alter both the marriage market and labor 
market opportunities significantly for women. As a result, the exclusion restriction assumption—that the policy 
affects marriage and childbearing outcomes of a woman through the change in her education only—is likely to 
be violated. Angrist et al. (1996) discuss the factors, like the fraction of compliers with the policy, that would 
determine the importance of such biases. 
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addition, since the treatment status of the birth-cohorts right around the discontinuity is not 
sharp in our data, we use multiple samples in our primary analysis: sample B excludes 1986 
and 1987 birth-cohorts, and sample C excludes 1985 to 1988 birth-cohorts, whereas sample A 
does not make such an exclusion. We also define a sample D, which includes all birth-cohorts 
from 1954 to 1998 except for those from 1985 to 1988. However, the specifications that are 
estimated with sample D always include a quadratic-time trend. 
If the timing of the change in the education policy were correlated with some 
unobserved characteristics that also affect marriage and fertility decisions, we would get 
biased estimates. For instance, if the policy change came right after some shock that 
decreased school enrollment rates while increasing marriage and fertility, there would be a 
problem. In this sense, it is important to note that the timing of the policy had to do with the 
political circumstances in 1997. As explained in Section 2, although improving the low 
lower-secondary school enrollment rates had long been in discussion by policy-makers, the 
extension of compulsory schooling was implemented in 1997 because the secular government 
that had recently came to power saw the policy also as a way of preventing young children 
from attending religious schools. 
6.2. Estimation 
6.2.1. Effect of the Policy on the Level of Schooling, Marriage, and First-Birth by Age 
In the estimation of the level effects of the policy, we also add a number of control 
variables to equation (1); therefore, the equation that we estimate is given by 
iiiii ZDxfY ηβρ +++= )( ,     (2) 
where iZ denotes the value of covariates for person i. These covariates include mother tongue, 
location of residence at age 12 in the form of location type (large city, small city, village) and 
geographical region, and mother’s educational attainment. Equation (2) is estimated at each 
age separately, using a logit regression. Standard errors are clustered at the level of birth-year 
because the policy variable does not exhibit variation across individuals within a birth-year 
cohort. 
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6.2.2. Effect of the Policy on the Timing of Marriage, First-Birth, and First-Birth after 
Marriage 
We use duration analysis to examine the time to marriage, first-birth, and first-birth 
after marriage. Here, the analysis uses data from different ages within the same estimation 
procedure; therefore, a time index (for age) is introduced. We choose a logistic form for the 
hazard function (for marriage and first-birth), given by 
tititit
it
it ZDxftb
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log ,   (3) 
where t denotes the waiting time concept—which is age, ith is the discrete time hazard rate at 
time t, b(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t. The baseline hazard function we choose is 
non-parametric: a piece-wise constant baseline hazard is used; therefore, we have age 
dummies for ages 10 to 21. The parameters of the functional form relationship between the 
forcing variable and the log odds of hazard ratio as well as the impact of the education policy 
( tρ ) vary by age. Finally, the effects of other covariates, tβ , are also allowed to vary by age. 
Some simplifications in the exact empirical specification of equation (3) are made. 
We allow the effect of the policy to change by age groups, rather than at each age; however, 
the time trend, as well as the baseline hazard, is allowed to vary by each age. While the 
effects of mother-tongue dummy variables and mother’s years of education variable are 
allowed to vary by age, the effect of controls for location of residence at age 12 do not vary 
by age. However, we use a finer level of controls, compared to Section 4.2.1, by including 
dummies for the interaction of type of location of residence (large city, small city, rural) with 
12 NUTS-1 level region dummies (35 dummy variables). 
7. Results 
In this section, we first examine the effects of the education policy on schooling 
outcomes of men and women, which bring about the changes in marriage and birth outcomes. 
Then, we examine the effect of policy on being ever-married and ever-giving-birth by age for 
teenage women. Finally, we explore the effect of the policy on the time to marriage and time 
to first-birth, as well as on the time to first-birth after marriage—which provides us important 
clues about the channels through which the education policy influences childbearing. 
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7.1. Impact of the Education Policy on Schooling  
Table 3 presents estimation results on the effect of the new education policy on grade 
completion status for women and men, separately. As explained before, three different 
samples are used in the estimations that employ linear time trends. In all samples (A, B, and 
C), there is strong evidence, statistically significant at the 1 percent level, that the new policy 
increases the completion probabilities of grades 6 to 8—the new years of compulsory 
schooling—for both men and women. As expected, in sample C, where transition years are 
excluded, the coefficients are larger: the policy increases the odds of completing the 8th grade 
by a factor of 5.6 for women and by a factor of 6.3 for men. Moreover, as suggested by the 
graphical illustration in Figure 1, the policy in fact increases the grade completion rates 
during high school years, which are not compulsory, for both women and men. Using sample 
C, there is evidence, statistically significant at the 1 percent level, that the policy increases the 
odds of the 11th grade completion rate by 34.5percent for women and by 56.1 percent for 
men. 
< TABLE 3 HERE > 
In order to assess the magnitude of the policy on schooling outcomes better, we 
present in Table 4 the predicted grade completion probabilities for the 1989 birth cohort with 
and without the policy in effect. These predicted probabilities are calculated based on the 
estimates for sample C in Table 3. The policy increases the 8th grade completion proabability 
by roughly 30 percentage points for women, from 59.3 to 89.2 percent, and by 23.5 
percentage points for men, from 70.3 to 93.8 percent. The rise in the 11th grade completion 
proabilites are also remarkable: it increases by 7.3 percentage points for women, from 48.3 to 
55.6 percent, and by more than 10 percentage points for men, from 54.1 to 64.8 percent.20 
< TABLE 4 HERE > 
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are based on a model where the time trend in 
schooling outcomes is assumed to be linear. According to the visual presentation in Figure 1, 
this in fact seems to be a reasonable assumption. Nonetheless, we test the robustness of our 
findings to this assumption by using a quadratic time trend. Yet, using a quadratic time trend 
has its own limitations. Since we do not have a sharp discontunity, a quadratic time trend is 
likely to capture part of the effect of the policy—especially in the samples that do not omit 
the transition period. The exclusion of the transition years alleviates this problem, but also 
                                               
20
 Tunalı and Yüret (2008) also report higher high school completion rates as a result of the new 
education policy. 
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introduces a new problem in the analysis at higher grade levels because then only few birth-
cohorts that are affected by the policy remain. These limitations must be taken into 
consideration in the interpretation of our findings regarding the effect of the policy on grade 
completion status, with a quadratic time trend, provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.21 
As can be seen from Table A1, with a quadratic time trend, the estimated effects of 
the policy on the completion of grades 6 to 8 are smaller for both women and men, compared 
to those in Table 3. This is expected as the quadratic time trend captures part of the effect of 
the policy as explained above.22 Yet, strong evidence, statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, remains for the effect of the policy in increasing the 6th to 8th grade completion rates in 
all samples. In grade levels 9 to 11, there is still strong evidence, with a quadratic time trend, 
that the policy increases the completion rates of women in sample B. However, in samples C 
and D, where more transitions years are excluded, both the statistical significance and the 
magnitude of the effect of the policy are weaker. At higher grade levels—where few birth 
cohorts that are affected by the policy are left in the sample with a wider exclusion of 
transition years in samples C and D, it is hard to disentangle the effect of the policy from a 
quadratic time trend, and the standard errors grow substantially as can be seen in Table A1. 
7.2. Impact of the Education Policy on Marriage and First-Birth of Teenage 
Women 
The estimation results on the effects of the education policy on ever being married 
and on ever giving birth are presented in panels (a) and (b) of Table 5, respectively. The 
estimates in Table 5 are given for four different samples, where a linear time trend is used in 
estimations with samples A to C whereas a quadratic time trend is used in the estimations 
with sample D. Based on the estimates in Table 5, we calculate the baseline and policy 
predicted values of the probabilities of ever being married and ever giving birth for the 1989 
birth-cohort and present these predicted values in Table 6.  
< TABLE 5 HERE > 
                                               
21
 In Table A1, the results for sample A are not provided because the problem of the quadratic time 
trend capturing the effect of the policy becomes especially severe when 1986 and 1987 cohorts are not excluded. 
22
 In sample C, where more transitions years are excluded compared to sample B, the estimated impact 
in grades 6 to 8 is larger for both men and women because the quadratic time trend is less likely to capture the 
effect of the policy when more transition years are excluded. 
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As can be seen from panel (a) of Table 5, there is evidence, statistically significant at 
least at the 5 percent level, that the education policy decreases the probability of being ever 
married until age 16 in sample A. As we exclude the transition birth-cohorts in samples B and 
C, there is evidence for the negative effect of the policy on marriage up to a higher age. In 
fact, in sample C, the education policy decreases the odds of marriage by age 18 by roughly 
25 percent. (As expected, we find stronger effects as we exclude the transition birht-cohorts.) 
Our estimates using sample D, which are based on a model with quadratic time trends, 
confirm that the policy decreases the probability of marriage by age 18. At or after age 19, we 
find no evidence for an effect of the policy on marriage outcomes.  
The magnitude of the effect of the policy on the marriage probability at teenage years 
is striking, as can be seen in panel (a) of Table 6. The probability of marriage by age 16 
decreases by 2.62 percentage points, from 6.85 to 4.23 percent, and the probability of 
marriage by age 18 falls by 4.21 percentage points, form 19.74 to 15.53 percent. In terms of 
percentage changes, the effect of the policy is stronger at earlier ages; for instance, while the 
drop in the probability of marriage by age 14 is 63.5 percent, the drop by age 18 is 21.3 
percent. This is expected as the policy increases the enrollment rates particularly in grades 6 
to 8, which correspond to roughly ages 12 to 14. However, the effect of the policy on 
marriage persists at ages well beyond the new compulsory schooling years, partly because the 
effect of policy on school enrollment also persists well beyond the new compulsory schooling 
years. 
< TABLE 6 HERE > 
The estimates of the effect of the education policy on ever giving birth are presented 
in panel (b) of Table 5. The effect of the policy on giving birth by early ages—until age 14—
is imprecisely estimated in all samples due to the low frequency of the event at these ages. 
However, there is strong evidence, statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level, that 
the policy decreases the probability of giving birth by age 15 and thereafter. The results based 
on samples A and B reveal that the effect of the policy persists until age 19. In fact, the odds 
of giving birth by age 19 decreases by about 35 percent as a results of the policy, according to 
the estimates based on sample B. There is no evidence for an effect of the policy on giving 
birth by age 20 (which can be tested only using sample A); however, we would need to 
observe a higher number of cohorts that are affected by the policy to make stronger 
statements about the effect of the policy beyond the teenage years. 
The magnitude of the education policy on birth outcomes is also quite remarkable. 
According to panel (b) of Table 6, the probabilty of giving birth by age 19 goes down by 4.7 
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percentage points, from 15.14 to 10.44 percent, for the 1989 birth-cohort as a result of the 
change in compulsory schooling in Turkey. As it was for the marriage analysis, the 
percentage drop in the fraction ever giving birth becomes smaller at higher ages. While the 
percentage drop in fraction ever giving birth by age 15 is 61 percent, it is 31 percent by age 
19. Yet, the percentage drop at age 19 is still striking in absolute terms. 
The estimated effects of the policy in Table 5 generally become larger as transition 
cohorts are excluded from sample A to B and from sample B to C, as expected. The estimates 
based on sample D—where a quadratic time trend is used—are in general less precise; 
however, statistical significance holds at later ages when the incidence of the event is higher, 
and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated with a linear 
time trend. In addition, that we find an effect of the policy on marriage by age 18 and on birth 
by age 19 is also consistent with the earlier discussion that marriage and first-birth can be 
seen as part of a rigid sequence of events, where the latter is observed soon after the former. 
7.2.1. A Falsification Test 
Here, we test the effect of an education policy that did not take place, to check the 
robustness of our findings. For this purpose, we slide the time-frame of our analysis 10 years 
back: we restrict the sample to cohorts born after 1953 (instead of 1963 as it was in the actual 
analysis), and we assume that the same education policy was implemented in 1987 (instead of 
the actual 1997) and, therefore, the policy affects cohorts born in 1977 and afterwards. We 
also exclude cohorts born after 1984 to make sure that this sample does not include any birth 
cohorts that might be affected by the policy. (Late starters among the 1985 and 1986 birth-
cohorts would be affected by the policy.) Using this sample, we carry out the same empirical 
analysis in the previous section. In Table 7, the results of this analysis are compared to the 
results of the actual policy presented earlier (in Table 5). Note that the sizes of the 
falsification and actual samples are quite similar.  
< TABLE 7 HERE > 
Table 7 shows that even though the coefficients in the falsification sample are mostly 
negative, they are substantially smaller than the estimates with the actual sample. In fact, the 
coefficients in the marriage regressions are very close to zero with the falsification sample. 
Moreover, the coefficient estimates in the falsification sample are all statistically 
insignificant, except for that for the first-birth regression at age 16 where statistical 
significance is at the 10 percent level; however, this coefficent estimate at -0.247 is 
substantially smaller than the corresponding coefficient estimate in the regression with the 
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actual sample at -0.637. In essence, we do not find an effect of the education policy with the 
falsification sample as it is supposed to be with a valid identification method. 
7.2.2. Discontinuity Samples 
Here, we restrict our analysis to samples covering only the birth-cohorts right around 
the discontinuity—what Angrist and Lavy (1999) call a “discontinuity sample” in their 
seminal application of regression discontinuity design. By limiting the sample to a narrow 
time-band, we can estimate the effect of the policy without polynomial controls for a time 
effect. The results of this analysis are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix for two different 
discontinuity samples. In both of these samples, the time frame is restricted to 1983 to 1990. 
In samples (A1) for marriage analysis and (B1) for first-birth analysis, 1986 and 1987 birth-
cohorts are excluded, as it was in Sample B of Table 5; whereas, in samples (A2) for 
marriage analysis and (B2) for first-birth analysis, 1985 to 1988 birth-cohorts are omitted, as 
it was in Sample C of Table 5. As can be seen from Table A1, the estimates with the 
discontinuity samples confirm our findings: the odds ratios in panels (A1) and (B1) for 
marriage and first-birth, respectively, are very similar to the corresponding values in Table 5 
given for sample B. Similarly, there is a very good match between the odds ratios given in 
panels (A2) and (B2) of Table A1 and the odds ratios for sample C in Table 5. 
7.2.3. Other Issues: Different Birth-Cohort Intervals, Time Trends 
In a final robustness exercise, we estimate equation equation (2) using different birth-
cohort intervals in our sample. Table A3 in the Appendix presents the results for three 
different samples; two of which cover a wider time-interval of birth-cohorts (after 1953 and 
after 1958), and one of which covers a narrower time-interval (after 1968). As can be seen 
from the table, the estimated odds ratios under different samples are very similar to each 
other, and to those in Table 5. In the last sample—which contains fewer observations—
statistical significance is lost at a few late ages due to larger standard errors; however, the 
magnitude of the odds ratios are similar.23 
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 We could not restrict the sample to even narrower time-intervals of birth-cohorts because, with a 
smaller sample, it becomes hard to statistically disentangle the effect of the policy from the time trend (as 
already indicated by the last sample in Table A4). However, narrow time-intervals are already examined in 
Section 6.2.2.. 
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The estimated coefficients for the linear time trends in samples A, B, and C are 
displayed in Table A4 in the Appendix. In both ever-married and ever-birth analyses, the 
estimated time trends are stronger at earlier ages, as it was suggested in Figure A1. A 
comparison of the estimated odds ratios for the time trends with the odds ratios for the policy 
effect allows us to calculate how many years it would take—in the absence of the policy—for 
ever-married and ever-birth rates to go down by a level that is equal to that generated by the 
policy. According to the estimates with sample C, it would take 20 years for marriage by age 
14, and 14 years for marriage by age 17 to decrease by a level that is equal to that caused by 
the policy. 
7.3. Impact of the Eduction Policy on the Timing of Marriage, First-Birth, and 
First-Birth after Marriage 
The previous section examined the effect of the education policy on the level of 
marriage and first-birth outcomes by age. In this section, using duration analysis, we first 
focus on the effect of the policy on the timing of marriage and first-birth outcomes. Then, we 
investigate the effect of the policy on the time to first-birth after marriage. 
7.3.1. Impact of the Policy on the Time to Marriage and First-Birth 
The analysis in Section 5.2 reveals the cumulative effect of the policy on marriage 
and first-birth outcomes by age; for instance, the effect of the policy on marriage by age 18, 
reported in Table 5, depends on the effect of the policy on marriage at each age before 18. 
Even if the policy has no effect on marriage at age 18, the policy may have an effect on 
marriage by age 18. Duration analysis allows us to uncover the ages at which the policy has 
an impact on marriage and first-birth outcomes. Moreover, it also allows us to compare the 
magnitude of the effect of the policy at various ages. 
< TABLE 8 HERE > 
Panel (a) of Table 8 shows that there is evidence, in all samples, for an effect of the 
policy on marriage probability at all age groups considered (10-11, 12-14, and 15-17). This 
effect is much stronger at earlier ages: the policy decreases the odds of marriage by 92 
percent at ages 10-11, by 66 percent at ages 12-14, and by 28 percent at ages 15-17 according 
to sample B. As can be seen in panel (b) of Table 8, the policy decreases the probability of 
first-birth at ages 15-17 and 18-19 (except for that in sample A, where the effect is weaker 
due to the inclusion of transition cohorts). In other words, the effect of the policy on first-
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birth by age 19, that we illustrated in Table 5, is not only due to the persistence of the effect 
of the policy at earlier ages—there is in fact a policy effect at ages 18 and 19, which are well 
beyond the new compulsory schooling years. The magnitude of the policy effect on first-birth 
is also stronger at earlier ages. The effects at the early ages of 12 to14 are very imprecisely 
estimated, as it was in Table 5. All these findings for both marrige and first-birth are robust to 
the inclusion of quadratic time trends in sample D. 
7.3.2. Impact of the Policy on the Time to First-Birth after Marriage 
The fall in the fraction of women who give birth at young ages, illustrated in Section 
5.2, could arise from two different mechanisms. First, it could be brought about by a change 
in the age at marriage; and, in fact, we illustrated in Section 5.2 that the fraction of women 
who get married at young ages went down as a result of the policy. However, there is another 
mechanism through which the fraction of women who give birth at young ages could go 
down. As a result of the higher education levels, caused by the education policy, married 
women could be delaying the birth of their first-child. In this subsection, we tackle this 
question: after a woman is married, do the longer compulsory schooling years increase the 
time to first-birth? 
In this analysis, women enter the risk set once they are married. The estimation results 
are presented in panel (c) of Table 8. In samples A, B, and C, there is evidence (statistically 
significant at least at the 5 percent level in samples A and B) that the education policy 
decreases the odds of first-birth at ages 15-17 and 18-19 for married women. Using sample D 
and quadratic time trends, there is statistical evidence at ages 18-19 only; however, the 
coefficient estimate at ages 15-17 is similar to those estimated with samples A to C. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the education policy also increased the time until first-birth 
for married women. This finding is quite important because unlike the time to marriage and 
time to first-birth analyses, in the time to first-birth after marriage analysis we know for sure 
that women are out of school (in the rigid sequence of schooling, marriage, and fertility in 
Turkey). In other words, the education policy has effects on women’s birth behavior even 
after they are out of school. This issue we discuss more in the next section. 
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8. Discussion 
In the conceptual framework section, we discussed two main channels through which 
education affects marriage and, therefore, birth outcomes: incarceration effect and human 
capital effect. Here, we interprete our key findings in this framework. 
We find a very strong incarceration effect of the education policy on teenage marriage 
and births. The probability of marriage drops substantially during the ages that girls are 
mandated to stay in school with the new education policy. At the same time, we also find that 
the effect of the new education policy on teenage marriage and births persists well beyond the 
new compulsory schooling years. While most children would complete grade 8 by age 14 or 
15, we find that the effect of the policy on marriage persists until age 18, and on first-birth 
until age 19. Similarly, Black et al. (2008) find that the effect of compulsory schooling on 
teenage fertility in the U.S. and in Norway also persists beyond the years the children are 
forced to stay in school, and interpret this as evidence for human capital effect. However, 
such a conclusion is not possible in our context because the effect of the new education 
policy on grade completion grades also persists well beyond the new compulsory schooling 
years in Turkey. In fact, even high school graduation rates—high school graduation takes 
place at age 17 or 18 for most people—increase remarkably as a result of the policy. 
Nonetheless, the results suggest that a human capital effect of the education policy 
also exists. If there was only an incarceration effect of the policy on marriage, the women 
who delay their marriage—that would otherwise happen at grade levels 6 to 8—due to the 
policy, would get married once the new compulsory schooling years are over. This ‘catching-
up effect’ could easily overwhelm— in the absence of human capital effect—the negative 
effect of the policy on marriage due to the increased enrollment at high school grades, 
because the fraction of girls who are induced to complete grades 6 to 8—for whom the 
‘catching-up effect’ would apply— is much larger than the fraction of girls who are induced 
to complete high school grades.24  
                                               
24
 We illustrate this idea quantitatively as follows. The new compulsory schooling policy induces 
roughly 75 percent of the girls who would not otherwise complete grades 6 to 8 to complete them (Table 4). 
Using the marriage rates at the corresponding ages (12 to 14) and assuming that marriage is random among the 
group of girls who comply with the policy and the group who do not comply with it, we calculate that 2.25 
percent of the girls in our sample would delay their marriage (that would otherwise happen at ages 12 to 14). At 
the same time, the new policy induces roughly 20 percent of the girls who would not otherwise complete grades 
9 and 10 to complete them. Using the marriage rates at the corresponding ages (15 and 16) and maintaining the 
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At the same time, we find clear evidence for a human-capital effect of the policy on 
the time to first-birth. The fact that a higher education level leads to an increase in the time to 
first-birth after marriage could obviously not be a result of the incarceration effect of the 
policy because—in the rigid sequence of schooling, marriage, and fertility in Turkey—all 
married women are out of school. This implies that increased education either increases the 
ability of teenage mothers to control their fertility or influences their preferences about it.  
Our estimated magnitude of the effect of the compulsory schooling policy on teenage 
fertility is much larger than that reported in developed countries (Black et al., 2006). In 
Western societies, teenage fertility may not be necessarily planned; it may happen due to 
idiosyncratic events. On the other hand, in Turkey, it is clearly planned along with marriage. 
Therefore, schooling puts a very strong break on teenage fertility in Turkey by preventing 
marriage, whereas it causes just a deceleration in the U.S. and Norway by decreasing the 
chances of pregnancy. On the other hand, similarly large effects are reported for developing 
countries. For instance, Ozier (2011) reports that a policy that brings about a 13 percetage 
point increase in high school graduation rate in Kenya also causes a 12 percentage point 
reduction in pregnancy by age 18. (We find a 4.5 percentage point reduction in first-birth by 
age 19.) 
Poverty is often pointed out as an important underlying factor for early marriage in 
several countries.25 Within Keeley’s (1979) search model, we can think of poverty as 
increasing search costs, thereby reducing the age at marriage. The new compulsory schooling 
policy in Turkey decreased the monetary costs of school attendance in grades 6 to 8 because 
the accessibility of schools increased: the government had to either provide schools that 
included these grade levels even in sparsely-populated areas or transport the students in these 
                                                                                                                                                  
assumption of randomness of marriage among compliers and non-compliers, we calculate that 1.87 percent of 
the girls in our sample would delay their marriage (that would otherwise take place at ages 15 or 16). If there 
was only an incarcertation effect of the policy, we would expect the girls who would marry in the absence of the 
policy at ages 12 to14 (2.25 percent) to marry at ages 15 or 16 once the new compulsory schooling years are 
over. However, their fraction is larger than the fraction that is induced not to the marry due to school enrollment 
in grades 9 and 10 (1.87 percent). Then, we would not observe a reduction in the marriage rates at high school 
ages, as we actually do. We realize that this sketch makes strong assumptions, but it is merely to illustrate the 
idea. 
25
 For instance, UNICEF (2005) reports for Senegal that girls in the poorest 20th percentile of 
households are more than 4 times as likely to be married as girls in the welathiet 20th precentile of households.  
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areas to a school on a daily basis. This fall in the costs of school attendance would obviously 
increase the opportunity cost of marriage.  
Nonetheless, previous studies on early marriage in Turkey point out cultural factors, 
rather than economic factors, as the key driving elements. For instance, Edirne et al. (2010) 
find that the parents of teenage mothers have lower education and are more likely to follow 
matrimonies, but do not have lower household income than other parents. In their qualitiative 
study in Eastern Turkey, Ertem and Koçtürk (2008) highlight the importance of “protecting 
family honor” as a reason for marriage once girls reach the age of menarche. If, in fact, 
cultural traditions are the main driving factor of early marriage and fertility, this study shows 
that these cultural traditions are not impossible to change, at least in Turkey. 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of the extension of compulsory schooling from 5 
to 8 years in Turkey on the marriage and fertility decisions of teenage women. We find that 
the rise in compulsory schooling years indeed reduces the probability of marriage and giving 
birth for teenage women. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is quite substantial. The 
proportion of women married by age 18 drops by more than 4 percentage points, and the 
proportion of women who give birth by age 19 drops by more than 4.5 percentage points for 
the 1989 birth-cohort (one of the ealier cohorts affected by the policy). 
We find a very strong incarceration effect of the new compulsory schooling policy on 
marriage and, therefore, on first-birth in Turkey. The probability of marriage is reduced 
susbstantially during the new compulsory schooling years. The policy decreases the 
probability of marriage by age 15 by 50 percent for the 1989 birth-cohort. Moreover, the 
effect of the policy extends well beyond the new compulsory schooling years; in fact, there is 
evidence that its effect on marriage persists until age 18, and its effect on first-birth persists 
until age 19. The effect of the policy on marriage and first-birth beyond the new compulsory 
schooling years could still result from an incacertation effect, as well as a human capital 
effect, because grade completion rates beyond the new compulsory schooling years also 
increase as a result of the policy. 
The delaying effect of the new education policy on first-birth could be brought about 
by two different mechanisms: by delaying the timing of marriage or by increasing the time to 
first-birth after marriage (or both). We find evidence for both. The fact that the new education 
policy increased the time to first-birth after marriage—a period where there is no 
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incarcertation effect in Turkey—implies that there are human capital effects of increased 
schooling. 
In essence, this study shows that increasing education at the lower end of the 
distribution, by an extension of compulsory schooling years, delays teenage marriage and 
childbearing substantially in an upper-middle income (World Bank classification) developing 
country. What remains to be seen in the Turkish context is the effect of this policy on total 
fertility, as well as spacing of births, which can be answered only after the initial cohorts 
affected by the policy complete their fecund period. Nevertheless, the previous empirical 
literature shows that increasing the age at marriage and childbearing would have important 
economic implications. Given the causal links between age at marriage and age at first-birth 
with several other demographic decisions (like divorce, number and spacing of children) and 
health outcomes (like maternal and child mortality) as well as economic decisions (labor 
force participation, migration) and outcomes (welfare take-up), the rise in age at marriage and 
age at first-birth would have important implications on the aggregate demography and 
economy, including population growth and economic growth. Moreover, they would have 
intergenerational impacts through their effects on child health and education. Finally, age at 
marriage and age at first-birth have non-economic implications on domestic violence and 
women’s decision-making power within the household. 
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Figure 1: Fraction Completed Selected Grade Levels by Year of Birth 
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Figure 2: Fractions of Women Ever Married and Women Ever Given Birth at Selected 
Ages by Year of Birth 
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Notes: The fitted lines are based on fractional polynomials. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Female Sample 
 
Mean S.D. Min. Max. No. Obs.
A) Person Level Characteristics
Year of Birth 1981.1 9.223 1964 1998 24,619     
Type of Place of Residence at Age 12
Province Center 0.391 0.485 0 1 24,390     
Other City/Town 0.203 0.408 0 1 24,390     
Village 0.406 0.492 0 1 24,390     
Region of Residence at Age 12
West 0.339 0.414 0 1 24,384     
South 0.128 0.342 0 1 24,384     
Center 0.154 0.338 0 1 24,384     
North 0.136 0.359 0 1 24,384     
East 0.243 0.481 0 1 24,384     
Mother-Tongue
Turkish 0.809 0.435 0 1 24,004     
Kurdish 0.169 0.419 0 1 24,004     
Arabic 0.022 0.159 0 1 24,004     
Mother's Educational Attainment
No School 0.462 0.500 0 1 23,131     
Some School but No Degree 0.088 0.279 0 1 23,131     
Compulsory Schooling 0.361 0.468 0 1 23,131     
More than Compulsory Schooling 0.089 0.270 0 1 23,131     
B) Person-Age Level Characteristics
Age 14.972 3.404 10 21 235,001   
Year 1993.5 8.158 1974 2008 235,001   
Education Policy 0.187 0.399 0 1 235,001   
Notes: West is defined as NUTS1 1 to 4 regions, South as NUTS1-6 region, Center as NUTS1 5 and 7 regions, North as
NUTS1 8 and 9 regions, and East as NUTS1 10 to 12 regions. Education policy variable takes the value of 1 for birth-
cohorts born in 1987 and afterwards, 0 otherwise.
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Table 2: Fractions of Women Ever Married and Women Ever Given Birth 
 
Age 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
% Married 0.04 0.14 0.42 1.17 3.04 6.72 12.4 20.0 29.1 38.3 47.3 55.6
% Given Birth -- -- 0.06 0.23 0.60 1.84 4.47 8.94 15.2 23.3 32.5 41.1
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Table 3: Effect of Education Policy on Grade Completion for Women and Men 
 
Grade Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
1 0.937 0.144 23,792 0.916 0.159 21,960 0.996 0.170 20,159
2 0.877 0.145 23,792 0.882 0.160 21,960 0.953 0.170 20,159
3 0.884 0.153 23,792 0.885 0.162 21,960 0.935 0.189 20,159
4 0.880 0.188 23,792 0.880 0.208 21,960 0.941 0.216 20,159
5 0.844 0.181 22,970 0.822 0.182 21,138 0.862 0.179 19,337
6 5.057*** 1.023 22,204 6.462*** 1.259 20,372 7.939*** 1.342 18,571
7 4.392*** 0.756 21,426 5.516*** 0.853 19,594 6.522*** 0.880 17,793
8 3.853*** 0.623 20,608 4.815*** 0.716 18,776 5.643*** 0.880 16,975
9 1.486*** 0.117 19,859 1.628*** 0.122 18,027 1.589*** 0.159 16,226
10 1.297*** 0.076 18,956 1.355*** 0.096 17,124 1.380*** 0.118 15,781
11 1.248*** 0.078 17,999 1.312*** 0.090 16,675 1.345*** 0.109 15,332
Grade Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
1 1.325 0.311 11,033 1.377 0.368 10,453 1.295 0.374 9,799
2 1.104 0.293 11,033 1.134 0.336 10,453 1.071 0.363 9,799
3 1.231 0.334 11,033 1.245 0.383 10,453 1.235 0.448 9,799
4 1.192 0.378 11,033 1.342 0.484 10,453 1.616 0.615 9,799
5 1.083 0.323 10,591 1.223 0.417 10,011 1.252 0.430 9,357
6 5.160*** 1.301 10,157 7.083*** 1.433 9,577 8.537*** 1.859 8,923
7 4.529*** 1.144 9,739 6.350*** 1.158 9,159 7.503*** 1.403 8,505
8 4.125*** 0.929 9,318 5.580*** 0.878 8,738 6.349*** 1.009 8,084
9 1.595*** 0.235 8,916 1.848*** 0.249 8,336 2.022*** 0.253 7,682
10 1.349** 0.170 8,523 1.533*** 0.168 7,943 1.603*** 0.174 7,289
11 1.329** 0.151 8,114 1.471*** 0.164 7,534 1.561*** 0.171 6,880
Notes: The sample includes 1964to 1998birth cohorts for 10years old, 1964 to 1993 birth cohorts for15 years old, and 1964 to 1988 birth cohorts
for20years old.However, due to the fuzzy nature of the discontinuity, 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts are omitted in sample Band 1985to 1988birth-
cohorts are omitted in sample C. A separate regression is run at each school year from 1 to 13 where the dependent variable is completion of school 
year. In addition to the dummy variable for the education policy, the specifications include a control for a linear time trend as wellas controls for
mother's mother-tongue (Kurdish, Arabic), and the location ofresidence at age 12(in the formof the type of location of residence [large city, small
city, rural]and 5geographical regions [west, south, central, north, east]). The sample formen is based on the 2008 survey only as the 2003survey
do not include information about the type of location of residence formen, whereas the female samples are based on both 2003and 2008surveys.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of year of birth.  *** statistical significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
A) Women
Sample A Sample B Sample C
B) Men
Sample A Sample B Sample C
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Table 4: Policy Effect on Predicted Grade Completion Rates for Men and Women 
 
Grade Level Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
6 0.604 0.924 *** 0.744 0.961 ***
7 0.594 0.905 *** 0.710 0.948 ***
8 0.593 0.892 *** 0.703 0.938 ***
9 0.500 0.614 *** 0.578 0.734 ***
10 0.490 0.570 *** 0.559 0.670 ***
11 0.483 0.556 *** 0.541 0.648 ***
Notes: The predicted values are for the 1989 birth cohort, based on the estimates forsample Cgiven in Table
3. All other variables are set at their mean values for women of the 1989 birth-cohort in panel (a) and for men of 
the 1989 birth-cohort in panel (b). The difference between the baseline and policy values is statistically
significant at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
A) Women B) Men
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Table 5: Effect of the Education Policy on Ever Being Married and on Ever Giving 
Birth for Teenage Women 
 
Age
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
11 0.243 0.212 21,634 0.097** 0.110 19,999 -- -- -- -- -- --
12 0.146*** 0.102 20,882 0.060*** 0.056 19,247 -- -- -- -- -- --
13 0.307** 0.147 20,112 0.213*** 0.111 18,477 0.219** 0.145 16,866 0.326 0.244 20,154
14 0.466** 0.139 19,308 0.372*** 0.130 17,673 0.363** 0.171 16,062 0.403 0.236 19,350
15 0.530*** 0.067 18,576 0.489*** 0.077 16,941 0.489*** 0.110 15,330 0.535** 0.143 18,618
16 0.693*** 0.092 17,759 0.709** 0.108 16,124 0.601*** 0.093 14,926 0.683** 0.129 18,214
17 0.928 0.132 16,889 0.799 0.115 15,715 0.665*** 0.092 14,517 0.732** 0.106 17,805
18 0.883 0.090 16,002 0.819** 0.082 15,311 0.748** 0.097 14,113 0.789* 0.105 17,401
19 1.026 0.093 15,124 0.961 0.110 14,433 -- -- -- -- -- --
20 1.067 0.065 14,372 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Age
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E.
No. 
Obs.
12 1.247 1.714 20,882 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
13 0.348 0.257 20,112 0.130** 0.127 18,477 -- -- -- -- -- --
14 0.480 0.235 19,308 0.410 0.267 17,673 0.450 0.342 16,062 0.587 0.553 19,350
15 0.429*** 0.119 18,576 0.387*** 0.132 16,941 0.372** 0.181 15,330 0.550 0.397 18,618
16 0.472*** 0.109 17,759 0.529** 0.146 16,124 0.472** 0.171 14,926 0.638 0.269 18,214
17 0.642** 0.124 16,889 0.558** 0.127 15,715 0.452*** 0.127 14,517 0.544** 0.162 17,805
18 0.791** 0.091 16,002 0.752** 0.098 15,311 0.625*** 0.068 14,113 0.728** 0.102 17,401
19 0.757** 0.103 15,124 0.653*** 0.089 14,433 -- -- -- -- -- --
20 0.968 0.105 14,372 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Sample D
Sample D
Notes:Foreach sample, a separate regression is run by age where the dependent variable is evermarried status in panel (A)and evergiven birth status in panel
(B). The originalsample (sample A) includes 35 birth-yearcohorts, 1964-1998, for 10years old; 30 birth-yearcohorts, 1964-1993, for 15years old; and, 25birth-
year-cohorts, 1964-1988, for 20 years old. Due to the fuzzy nature of the discontinuity, 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts are omitted in Sample B, and 1985 to 1988
birth cohorts are omitted in Sample C. Sample Dcovers 1954 to 1998 birth cohorts, excluding 1985 to 1988 birth cohorts. While a linear time trend is included in
regressions using samples Ato C, a quadratic time trend is included in regressions using sample D. The othercontrol variables include mother's mother-tongue
(Kurdish, Arabic), mother's educationalattainment, and the location of residence at age 12(in the formof the type of location of residence [large city, smallcity,
rural] and 5 geographicalregions [west, south, central, north, east]). Standard errors are clustered at the level ofyear ofbirth. Some cells forage 12and 13are
missing because the policy effect is not identified due to infrequent incidence of marriage and birth at these ages. Some cells at the latest ages, ages 19 and 20,
are missing because the earliest waves of birth cohorts that are affected by the policy are excluded due to the fuzzy nature of the discontinuity. *** statistical
significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
A) Dependent Variable: Ever Married
B) Dependent Variable: Ever Birth
Sample A Sample B Sample C
Sample A Sample B Sample C
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Table 6: Effect of Education Policy on Predicted Percentages of Ever Being Married 
and Ever Giving Birth 
 
Baseline Policy % Drop Baseline Policy % Drop
Age 13 0.21 0.05 ** 78.1 Age 13 0.03 0.00 ** 87.0
Age 14 1.04 0.38 ** 63.5 Age 14 0.10 0.04 59.0
Age 15 3.14 1.56 *** 50.3 Age 15 0.45 0.18 *** 61.2
Age 16 6.85 4.23 *** 38.2 Age 16 1.47 0.78 ** 46.8
Age 17 12.47 8.66 *** 30.6 Age 17 4.24 2.41 ** 43.1
Age 18 19.74 15.53 ** 21.3 Age 18 8.45 6.48 ** 23.2
Age 19 -- -- -- Age 19 15.14 10.44 *** 31.1
A) Ever Married B) Gave Birth
Notes: Predicted values are given for the 1989 birth-cohort, where all other variables are set at their mean values for this
birth cohort. In calculating the predicted values for evermarried, estimates fromSample Cin panel (a)of Table 5 are used;
and in calculating the predicted values for given birth, estimates fromSample Bof panel (b) of Table 5are used because
Sample C does not provide estimates at age 19. That the predicted policy value is different fromthe predicted baseline
value is statistically significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
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Table 7: Falsification Test - Effect of an Education Policy that did not Take Place 
 
Coef. S.E. No obs Coef. S.E. No obs
A) Ever Married Regressions
Age 13 -0.354 0.225 16,634     -1.520** 0.663 16,866     
Age 14 -0.067 0.164 16,634     -1.013** 0.470 16,062     
Age 15 -0.038 0.133 16,634     -0.716*** 0.226 15,330     
Age 16 -0.091 0.098 16,634     -0.509*** 0.154 14,926     
Age 17 -0.122 0.086 16,634     -0.407*** 0.138 14,517     
Age 18 -0.044 0.063 16,634     -0.291** 0.129 14,113     
B) First-Birth Regressions
Age 13 0.154 0.558 16,634     -2.038** 0.977 18,477     
Age 14 -0.218 0.352 16,634     -0.891 0.652 17,673     
Age 15 -0.240 0.218 16,634     -0.950*** 0.341 16,941     
Age 16 -0.247* 0.147 16,634     -0.637** 0.276 16,124     
Age 17 -0.086 0.149 16,634     -0.583** 0.228      15,715 
Age 18 -0.138 0.124 16,634     -0.285** 0.131 15,311     
Age 19 -0.113 0.095 16,634     -0.426*** 0.137 14,433     
Falsification Actual
Notes: The falsification sample includes 1954 to 1984 birth cohorts, who are not affected by the policy. The actual sample in
panel (a) is the same sample as "Sample C" in Table 5 as predictions on ever married status in Table 6are based on this sample;
and, the actualsample in panel(b) is the same sample as "SampleB" in Table 5as predictions on evergiven birth status in Table
6are based on this sample. For all samples, a separate regression is run by age, where, in addition to the dummy variable for the
"artificial" education policy that afects cohorts born in 1977 and afterwards and the actualeducation policy that affects cohorts
born in 1987 and afterwards, the specifications include a control for a linear time trend as well as controls for mother's mother
tongue (Kurdish, Arabic), mother's educational attainment, location of residence at age 12 (in the formof type of location of
residence [rural, smallcity, large city]and 5geographical regions). Standard errors areclustered at the levelof yearof birth. ***
statistical significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
 
 45
Table 8: Duration Analysis Results - Effect of Education Policy on Time to First 
Marriage, Time to First Birth, and Time to First Birth after Marriage 
 
A) Time to Marriage
Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E.
Policy * Ages 10-11 0.209* 0.182 0.081** 0.091
Policy * Ages 10-14 0.180** 0.128 0.275* 0.212
Policy * Ages 12-14 0.433*** 0.127 0.342*** 0.118
Policy * Ages 15-17 0.778** 0.084 0.725*** 0.086 0.632*** 0.084 0.732** 0.112
Policy * Ages 18-19 0.963 0.121 0.904 0.150 0.717 0.176 0.778 0.199
Policy * Age 20 0.876 0.120 0.843 0.131
Number of Obs 190,423   176,024   161,856   192,476   
Number of Persons 21,337     19,810     18,305     21,070     
B) Time to First-Birth
Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E.
Policy * Ages 12-14 0.442* 0.215 0.376 0.242 0.396 0.295 0.495 0.451
Policy * Ages 15-17 0.600*** 0.103 0.556*** 0.109 0.480*** 0.121 0.588* 0.160
Policy * Ages 18-19 0.816 0.111 0.702*** 0.087 0.594*** 0.065 0.664*** 0.095
Policy * Age 20 1.204 0.195 1.002 0.111
Number of Obs 158,266   146,611   135,167   162,978   
Number of Persons 19,861     18,328     16,816     19,582     
C) Time to First-Birth after Marriage
Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. Odds Ratio S.E.
Policy * Ages 12-14 1.639 0.634 1.789 1.043 2.029 1.433 2.565 2.061
Policy * Ages 15-17 0.668*** 0.089 0.670** 0.115 0.663* 0.158 0.733 0.197
Policy * Ages 18-19 0.757** 0.103 0.676** 0.104 0.610** 0.143 0.643* 0.166
Policy * Age 20 1.137 0.240 0.873 0.095
Number of Obs 20,706     19,816     18,935     25,186     
Number of Subjects 8,222       7,875       7,516       9,676       
Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D
Notes:The data are arranged in a duration analysis format, in which thewaiting timeconcept is age. In panel (a), each woman enters the risk set when
she is 10years old and remains in the sample until she gets married; in panel (b), each woman enters the riskset when she is 12 years old and remains
in the sample until she gives birth; in panel (c), a woman enters the risk set when she gets married and remains in the sample until she gives birth. In all 
panels, right-censoring takes place when the woman completes age 21 or reaches the age at which she is surveyed. A logistic functional form
specification is chosen. The baseline hazard function (in age) has a piecewise constant form. The original sample, sample A, includes 35 birth-year
cohorts:1964-1998. In Sample B, 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts are omitted; in sample C, 1985 to 1988 birth cohorts are omitted. SampleDincludes 1954
to 1998birth cohorts, excluding 1985to 1988. The regressions run forsamples A, B, and Cincludeage-varying controls fora linear time trend, whereas
the regressions for sample Dincludeage-varying controls fora quadratic time trend. Other controls include mother's mother-tongue (Kurdish, Arabic)
and mother's years of schooling--which are both allowed to vary by age (the baseline variable)--and the location of residenceof the woman when she
was 12-years-old (in the formof 35 dummies for the interaction ofthe typeof location of residence [large city, small city, rural] with 12 NUTS-1level
geographicalregions). Standard errors are clustered at the levelofyearofbirth. *** statistical significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5percent level; *
at 10 percent level.
Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D
Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A1: Assessing Linearity of the Trend in Fraction Ever Married and Fraction 
Ever Given Birth by Age 
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Table A1: Effect of Education Policy on Grade Completion for Women and Men – 
Quadratic Time Trend 
 
Grade Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
1 0.695 0.197 21,960 0.779 0.240 20,159 0.845 0.222 23,542
2 0.664 0.197 21,960 0.730 0.243 20,159 0.799 0.229 23,542
3 0.632 0.183 21,960 0.638 0.243 20,159 0.721 0.240 23,542
4 0.573 0.220 21,960 0.598 0.258 20,159 0.747 0.289 23,542
5 0.653 0.256 21,138 0.715 0.293 19,337 0.827 0.286 22,720
6 3.796*** 1.141 20,372 4.609*** 1.439 18,571 5.331*** 1.269 21,954
7 3.851*** 0.896 19,594 4.658*** 1.056 17,793 4.710*** 0.843 21,176
8 3.402*** 0.704 18,776 3.870*** 0.986 16,975 3.970*** 0.765 20,358
9 1.565*** 0.174 18,027 1.389* 0.269 16,226 1.207 0.184 19,609
10 1.287* 0.175 17,124 1.276 0.259 15,781 1.069 0.164 19,164
11 1.309** 0.175 16,675 1.335 0.267 15,332 1.076 0.164 18,715
Grade Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
1 1.010 0.321 10,453 0.866 0.310 9,799 0.839 0.312 10,838
2 0.664 0.217 10,453 0.519 0.217 9,799 0.553 0.236 10,838
3 0.717 0.244 10,453 0.615 0.288 9,799 0.637 0.305 10,838
4 0.607 0.243 10,453 0.749 0.371 9,799 0.855 0.450 10,838
5 0.546 0.241 10,011 0.490 0.225 9,357 0.626 0.322 10,396
6 2.610*** 0.510 9,577 2.853*** 0.764 8,923 3.681*** 0.863 9,962
7 2.553*** 0.534 9,159 2.766*** 0.661 8,505 3.572*** 0.706 9,544
8 2.593*** 0.534 8,738 2.724*** 0.600 8,084 3.263*** 0.577 9,123
9 1.219 0.257 8,336 1.241 0.266 7,682 1.253 0.250 8,721
10 1.247 0.217 7,943 1.276 0.245 7,289 1.088 0.209 8,328
11 1.188 0.218 7,534 1.315 0.286 6,880 1.068 0.216 7,919
A) Women
Sample C Sample D
Notes: Sample B and sample C are as defined in Table 3. Sample D includes all 1954 to 1998 birth-cohorts, excluding 1985 to 1988. A separate
regression is run at each schoolyear from1to 13where the dependent variable is completion ofschool year. In addition to the dummy variable for
the education policy, the specifications include a control for a quadratic time trend as well as controls for mother's mother-tongue (Kurdish,
Arabic), and the location of residence at age 12 (in the formof the type of location of residence [large city, small city, rural] and 5geographical
regions [west, south, central, north, east]). The sample for men is based on the 2008 survey only as the 2003 survey do not include information
about the type of location of residence for men, whereas the female samples are based on both 2003 and 2008 surveys. Standard errors are
clustered at the level of year of birth.  *** statistical significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
Sample DSample B Sample C
B) Men
Sample B
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Table A2: Effect of the Education Policy around the Discontinuity 
 
Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Age 12 0.277 0.280 4,762 -- -- --
Age 13 0.195*** 0.088 4,762 0.223* 0.171 3,151
Age 14 0.311** 0.145 4,328 0.282 0.230 2,717
Age 15 0.475*** 0.078 3,939 0.498** 0.154 2,328
Age 16 0.761** 0.103 3,526 0.627*** 0.073 2,328
Age 17 0.824 0.116 3,526 0.669*** 0.042 2,328
Age 18 0.790** 0.089 3,526 0.701*** 0.092 2,328
Age 19 0.883 0.114 2,648 -- -- --
Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs. Odds Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Age 13 0.300 0.345 5,202 -- -- --
Age 14 0.299 0.232 4,328 0.294 0.290 2,717
Age 15 0.326* 0.194 3,939 0.283* 0.194 2,328
Age 16 0.429*** 0.131 3,902 0.370*** 0.138 2,328
Age 17 0.589*** 0.113 3,902 0.519*** 0.119 2,328
Age 18 0.686** 0.106 3,902 0.599*** 0.116 2,328
Age 19 0.618*** 0.095 2,925 -- -- --
Notes: A separate regression is run by age where the dependent variable is ever married status in panel (a) and ever given birth
status in panel (b). In addition to the dummy variable for the education policy, all specifications include controls for mother's mother-
tongue (Kurdish, Arabic), mother's educational attaiment, and the location of residence at age 12 (in the form of the type of location
of residence [large city, small city, rural] and 5 geographical regions [west, south, central, north, east]). Standard errors are clustered
at the level of year of birth. Some cells for ages 12 and 13 are missing because the policy effect is not identified due to infrequent
occurence of marriage and birth at these ages. Some cells at age 19 are missing because the earliest waves of birth cohorts that are
affected by the policy are excluded due to the fuzzy nature of the discontinuity. *** statistical significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5
percent level; * at 10 percent level.
A) Dependent Variable: Ever Married
A1) 1983-1985 and 1988-1990 A2) 1983-1984 and 1989-1990
B) Dependent Variable: Ever Birth
B1) 1983-1985 and 1988-1990 B2) 1983-1984 and 1989-1990
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Table A3: Robustness Check – Different Year-of-Birth Intervals 
 
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Age 13 0.178*** 0.114 20,154 0.193** 0.125 19,988 0.260* 0.182 15,105
Age 14 0.359** 0.160 19,350 0.379** 0.170 19,184 0.379** 0.187 14,301
Age 15 0.525*** 0.113 18,618 0.520*** 0.112 18,452 0.520*** 0.122 13,569
Age 16 0.637*** 0.091 18,214 0.670*** 0.097 18,048 0.714** 0.114 13,165
Age 17 0.704*** 0.095 17,805 0.761** 0.106 17,639 0.787 0.122 12,756
Age 18 0.794* 0.099 17,401 0.828 0.106 17,235 0.870 0.114 12,352
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Age 13 0.150** 0.138 21,765 0.143** 0.131 20,772 0.108** 0.114 15,889
Age 14 0.414 0.261 20,961 0.441 0.283 19,968 0.392 0.264 15,085
Age 15 0.328*** 0.102 20,229 0.351*** 0.113 19,236 0.354*** 0.141 14,353
Age 16 0.460*** 0.122 19,412 0.478*** 0.129 18,419 0.535** 0.158 13,536
Age 17 0.551*** 0.123 19,003 0.569** 0.127 18,010 0.593** 0.142 13,127
Age 18 0.760** 0.092 18,599 0.782** 0.096 17,606 0.843 0.124 12,723
Age 19 0.681*** 0.090 17,721 0.689*** 0.092 16,728 0.721** 0.100 11,845
Notes:The samples in panel (a) forever marriage excludes 1985to 1988birth cohorts, like "Sample C" in Tables 4, because the predictions
forevermarriage in Table5 are based on this sample; whereas the samples in panel (b) for everbirth excludes 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts,
like"SampleB" in Table 4, as the predictions in Table 5foreverbirth is based on this sample. Foreach sample, a separate regression is run
by age where the dependent variable is ever married status in panel (a) and evergiven birth status in panel (b). In addition to the dummy
variable for the education policy, all specifications include a control for a linear time trend as wellas controls for mother's mother-tongue
(Kurdish, Arabic), mother's educational attaiment, and the location of residenceat age12 (in the formof the type of location ofresidence
[large city, smallcity, rural]and 5geographical regions [west, south, central, north, east]). Standard errors are clustered at the level ofyear
of birth.  *** statistical significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
A) Dependent Variable: Ever Married
Year of Birth > 1953 Year of Birth > 1958 Year of Birth > 1968
B) Dependent Variable: Ever Birth
Year of Birth > 1953 Year of Birth > 1958 Year of Birth > 1968
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Table A4: Effects of Linear Time-Trends on Ever Being Married and Ever Giving Birth 
by Age 
 
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Age 11 0.963 0.030 21,634 0.953 0.033 19,999 -- -- --
Age 12 0.935*** 0.015 20,882 0.928*** 0.016 19,247 -- -- --
Age 13 0.928*** 0.010 20,112 0.921*** 0.009 18,477 0.922*** 0.011 16,866
Age 14 0.949*** 0.008 19,308 0.949*** 0.009 17,673 0.951*** 0.010 16,062
Age 15 0.960*** 0.004 18,576 0.962*** 0.004 16,941 0.961*** 0.005 15,330
Age 16 0.963*** 0.004 17,759 0.965*** 0.004 16,124 0.968*** 0.004 14,926
Age 17 0.964*** 0.005 16,889 0.968*** 0.004 15,715 0.971*** 0.003 14,517
Age 18 0.971*** 0.003 16,002 0.971*** 0.003 15,311 0.974*** 0.003 14,113
Age 19 0.969*** 0.003 15,124 0.969*** 0.003 14,433 -- -- --
Age 20 0.966*** 0.005 14,372 -- -- -- -- -- --
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Odds 
Ratio S.E. No. Obs.
Age 12 0.907* 0.046 20,882 -- -- -- -- -- --
Age 13 0.934*** 0.024 20,112 0.932** 0.027 18,477 -- -- --
Age 14 0.933*** 0.013 19,308 0.930*** 0.014 17,673 0.933*** 0.016 16,062
Age 15 0.941*** 0.010 18,576 0.939*** 0.011 16,941 0.938*** 0.012 15,330
Age 16 0.948*** 0.006 17,759 0.948*** 0.007 16,124 0.948*** 0.008 14,926
Age 17 0.961*** 0.005 16,889 0.964*** 0.005 15,715 0.966*** 0.006 14,517
Age 18 0.970*** 0.004 16,002 0.970*** 0.005 15,311 0.974*** 0.004 14,113
Age 19 0.973*** 0.003 15,124 0.975*** 0.003 14,433 -- -- --
Age 20 0.971*** 0.003 14,372 -- -- -- -- -- --
Notes: The originalsample (sample A) includes 35 birth-yearcohorts, 1964-1998, for 10years old; 30 birth-yearcohorts, 1964-1993, for 15years
old; and, 25birth-year-cohorts, 1964-1988, for 20years old. Due to the fuzzy nature of the discontinuity, 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts are omitted
in Sample B, and 1985 to 1988 birth cohorts are omitted in Sample C. For each sample, a separate regression is run by age where the dependent
variable is evermarried status in panel(A)and evergiven birth status in panel(B). In addition to thedummy variable for the education policy, all
specifications include a control for a linear time trend as well as controls for mother's mother-tongue (Kurdish, Arabic), mother's educational
attaiment, and the location of residence at age 12(in the formof the typeof location of residence [largecity, smallcity, rural] and 5geographical
regions [west, south, central, north, east]). Standard errors are clustered at the level of year of birth. Some cells for age 12 and 13 aremissing
because thepolicy effect is not identified due to infrequent occurence of marriageand birth at these ages. Some cells at the latest ages, ages 19
and 20, are missing because the earliest waves of birth cohorts that are affected by the policy are excluded due to the fuzzy nature of the
discontinuity. *** statistical significance at 1 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; * at 10 percent level.
A) Dependent Variable: Ever Married
Sample A Sample B Sample C
B) Dependent Variable: Ever Birth
Sample A Sample B Sample C
 
